CONTEMPORARY HYDROLOGICAL WEAPONIZATION: STRATEGIC FALLOUT OF THE INDUS BASIN

Abstract

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has remained one of the most resilient bilateral water-sharing arrangements, surviving amid three major wars. Yet it now faces renewed geopolitical stress, brought on by the current hostile situation between India and Pakistan, rendering the question of its suspension and the divergence of the Indus waters of utmost importance. This paper, under the larger ambit of contemporary food security, presents a critical inquiry into the weaponisation of water. The study explores the legal permissibility and strategic ramifications of a unilateral suspension or breach of the IWT under its own terms and through the lens of the law of treaties and customary international law governing transboundary watercourses. In addition, international responsibility is held against states and their heads of state for the targeting of hydrological infrastructure indispensable to the civilian population. The paper emphasises the dispute-resolution mechanisms under the IWT and the possible recourse to the World Bank and the ICJ. A cornerstone of the paper is the integration of quantitative assessments of India’s hydrological and infrastructural capacity, including technical dam specifications, the basin's sources, and seasonal effects on water levels and flow, to assess the veracity of India’s claim to divert the flow of the Indus. Ultimately, the paper concludes by reaffirming that a unilateral suspension of the Treaty and the targeting of infrastructure containing dangerous forces constitute a violation of international law, while diverting the Indus remains materially unfeasible and impractical given India’s current structural limitations.